Deconstructing the Emotions For the Sake of Comparative Research

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(Tony Manstead, Agneta Fischer, and Nico Frijda, organizers).
What types of cross-cultural variations in “feelings and emotions” are we able to imagine, given our understanding of what it means to be a “person” (that is, a mentally endowed human being)? And what types of evidence on mental functioning in other cultures would we want to collect to convince us that those imaginable (and hence logically conceivable) variations in “feelings and emotions” are actually real? What predictions, if any, follow from the idea of having an “emotional” life? And what predictions, if any, follow from the idea of having a mental life organized by some particular emotion, such as “sadness”, “envy”, “guilt” or “love”?

I suspect those questions are unavoidable in a scholarly discipline such as cultural psychology, which aims to develop a credible account of psychological differences across cultural groups (see, for example, Briggs, 1970; Cole, 1988, 1990, 1996; Bruner, 1990; Nisbett and Cohen, 1995; D’Andrade, 1984, 1987; Geertz, 1973; Goddard, 1997; Good and Kleinman, 1984; Haidit, Koller and Dias, 1993; LeVine, 1990; Levy, 1984; Lutz, 1985; Lutz and White, 1986; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Markus, Kitayama and Heiman, 1998; Miller, 1997; Rosaldo, 1984; Shweder, 1988, 1991, In press; Shweder et al, 1998; Shweder and LeVine, 1984; Shweder and Sullivan, 1992; Wierzbicka, 1993, 1999). Nevertheless, my main reason for raising them on this occasion is to explore a particular argument made by the comparative descriptive linguists Anna Wierzbicka and Cliff Goddard (Wierzbicka 1999; also see Wierzbicka 1989, 1990, 1993; Goddard 2001; Goddard and Wierzbicka 1994). Wierzbicka and Goddard have argued that the complex mental states referred to with English words for “emotions” (words such as “sadness”, “envy”, “guilt” or “love”) should be theoretically decomposed into more elementary mental processes such as wanting, knowing, feeling and evaluating things as good or not good. They have suggested that the ideas of “thinking”, “feeling”, “wanting”, “knowing”, and evaluating things as “good” (or not “good”) are semantically simple, intuitively obvious, readily available universal folk concepts, which is why those ideas have been found by linguists to be natural language “primes”. [A natural language “prime” is any idea that has been lexically encoded – there is a single word like element for it - in every known human language.] Wierzbicka and Goddard have suggested that this is not true of the idea of “emotions”, which at the very least is semantically complex,
not universally acknowledged as a folk concept, and not a linguistic “prime.” Her main point is that for the sake of the development of a universal theoretical language for comparative research on the meaning and translation of mental states across cultural groups the idea of “feeling” ought to take theoretical precedence over the idea of an “emotion”. Alternatively stated, the language of the “emotions” per se (the language of “sadness”, “envy”, “guilt”, “love”) is not an ideal “etic” language (Pike, 1967) for making progress on the cross-cultural study of human mental functioning.

Of course, emotions are not words. But what they are is something we must form an idea of, conceptualize and define, or at least elucidate, if we are to know what we are talking about when we use words to theorize about the “emotions” and record them. My interest in Anna Wierzbicka and Cliff Goddard proposal, which they derive from work in comparative linguistics, is undoubtedly related to the fact that a cognate argument can be found in some of my own writings in cultural psychology (e.g., Shweder, 1994; Shweder and Haidt, 2000). In those formulations it has been suggested that certain empirical questions about “emotions” (for example, are there universal or “basic” emotions?) are best answered by analyzing or semantically “deconstructing” the concept of an emotion into a series of component meanings (described below). It has been proposed that those components of meaning – for example, the semantic components of “anger” involving a “desire” (for revenge) plus (e.g.) an “affective feeling” (of arousal, agitation or tension) should be empirically sampled for their co-occurrence and distribution properties across mental events or mental episodes. One can then ask whether those components of meaning actually combine in identical ways in the mental life of members in all cultural communities.

Paralleling Wierzbicka’s and Goddard’s proposal I have suggested that the idea of an “emotion” is a complex synthetic notion; and particular emotions (e.g., sadness, envy, guilt and love) are derivatives of various combinations of wants, beliefs, feelings and values. [Note #1 here] From that theoretical perspective in cultural psychology, “emotions” are but one of several possible ways to give shape and lend meaning to the more fundamental and direct experience of wanting certain things, valuing certain things, knowing certain things and having certain somatic and affective “feelings”. Consequently, in this essay I consider the advantages of privileging the study of somatic and affective
“feelings” (the feelings of the body – for example, dizziness or pain – and the feelings of the “self” or “soul” – for example, emptiness or frustration) over the study of the “emotions”. In some small measure I seek to elaborate on the Wierzbicka and Goddard claim that the language of “emotions” per se is not an ideal theoretical language for making progress on the study of mental states across human populations.

A caution to the reader, however. Although I theoretically privilege “feelings” over “emotions” I certainly do not rule out the possibility that some particular combinations of wants, feelings, beliefs and values (for example, those combinations labeled with the English words “anger” or “fear” or “sadness”) are readily synthesized and occur everywhere in the world. If and when they occur, those universal combinations of wants, feelings, beliefs and values may, of course, occur whether or not such “emotions” are symbolically available as a single word in some natural language. I do maintain however that the theoretical deconstruction of the “emotions” into their components of meaning is a necessary step for research in cultural psychology. Unless that step is taken cultural psychology will have little hope of ever empirically engaging or credibly critiquing the claim that human emotional functioning is pretty much the same wherever you go. Unless that step is taken cultural psychology will also have little hope of ever establishing that particular combinations of wants, feelings, beliefs and values are distinctive of particular cultural mentalities and unequally distributed across the mental lives of members of different cultural groups.

Cultural Variations in “Feelings and Emotions”: Which Are Imaginable?

Before undertaking an empirical investigation aimed at documenting differences in psychological functioning across human populations it is a useful exercise to identify types of mental differences that one might conceivably or plausibly discover. When trying to imagine possible cross-cultural differences in “feelings and emotions” in particular there is a continuum of hypothetical possibilities that runs from those that are easy to bring to mind to those that seem impossible to even conceptualize.

On the easy to imagine side of things, one can readily understand and accept that the particular “environmental determinants” or “eliciting events” for particular “emotions” may be different in other cultures. For example, that there are places in the world where
receiving a compliment on one's pregnancy may not elicit “pride” or “gratitude” but rather “anxiety” or “fear” (e.g., of the “evil eye” or of the effects of other people’s wicked intentions). Thus, we readily acknowledge and can easily see that the things experienced as “threatening” or the events experienced as a “loss” or as an “insult” or as the “blockage of one’s goals” may not be the same from place to place. No particular conceptual difficulties arise in this type of case because we are confident that we can relate the differential “emotional” impact of the eliciting event to some variation in culturally endorsed beliefs or in the real or perceived consequence of the event in that local cultural context.

We also find it rather easy to imagine other types of differences in the psychological functioning of members of different cultural groups. We can quickly assent to the idea that in some other culture some particular emotion (say, “anger” or “envy” or “sadness”) may not be displayed, expressed or communicated to others (or even to oneself). This might be so, we readily and coherently consider, even when the “emotion” is mentally “active” and consciously or unconsciously “experienced” by members of that society. Again no particular conceptual difficulties arise in this type of case because we imagine that we can relate the absence of any outward signs of the emotion to some anticipated advantage that follows from keeping the emotion hidden.

There are, of course, certain presuppositions upon which we rely when making this interpretation, viz., that people around the world anticipate the future consequences of their own expressive behavior and also want to have more of the things they desire or think of as “good”. Nevertheless those presuppositions fit squarely within our picture of what it means to be a “person.” Hence, no interpretive problems arise if some anthropologist interested in cultural psychology reports the following. That many Balinese Hindus believe it makes things really difficult for the soul of the deceased (and also brings bad luck) if anyone cries or expresses grief at cremation ceremonies. Hence, at such occasions there is no public display of negative emotions; indeed the event appears to be a celebration.

There are other cross-cultural differences in “feelings and emotions” that are easy to imagine. I would include the possibility that changes of biological state are not experienced or “felt” in the same way across cultural groups. Biologically “normal”
human beings in all cultures have an autonomic arousal system, which has the capacity to increase the rate of heart contractions and redirect the flow of blood from the gut and skin to the muscles. As a result of autonomic arousal the skin blanches and cools. During a state of autonomic arousal it is widely reported that the gut “feels empty”. Nevertheless some cross-cultural researchers (most recently, Hinton and Hinton, in press) have raised the possibility that not all peoples respond in the same way to changes in biological state. The Hintons draw our attention to the phenomenon of “autonomic response specificity”.

The idea of “autonomic response specificity” invites us to entertain the possibility that some peoples characteristically experience autonomic arousal with distinctive somatic and affective feelings. For example, among Cambodians, autonomic arousal is often associated with such “feelings” and experiences as dizziness, tinnitus (ringing in the ears), blurred vision, neck tension, joint pains, muscle aches and perhaps even a sense of panic linked to an anticipation of death. Reading Hinton and Hinton (in press; also Hinton, Um and Ba 2001) one realizes that one can and must admit for consideration the logical possibility that autonomic arousal (an objective state of the body) does not produce the same sensations, feelings, or subjective experiences everywhere you go. This type of evidence challenges us to come up with an account of either local Cambodian biology or local Cambodian beliefs about illness and the body that might explain the existence of culturally distinctive subjective experiences under conditions of autonomic arousal. One aspect of the Hintons’ own explanation is discussed below.

We also find it rather easy to entertain the possibility that the “same emotion”, take “guilt” for example, may be coped with or managed differently in different cultures. Again no particular conceptual difficulty arises if it should turn out that in some corner of India people do not confess their sins and transgressions but rather unload them in some other kind of way. This coping process might unfold by passing along or transferring ones own spiritual debts to beggars via alms, thereby increasing the relative amount of one’s own religious merit. Indeed, for some residents in the temple town of Bhubaneswar in Orissa, India, where I have done some research, the mental experience of giving alms (or “charitable donations”) to a beggar amounts to the feeling of a transfer of ‘sins’ from the giver of the “gift” to the receiver. In this system for shaping and structuring ones
“feelings and emotions” the beggar plays the part of scapegoat, who by accepting material “gifts” (rice or money) from those who are better off, also takes on the burden (including the karmic consequences) of their sins. The giver, by means of the “gift” feels relieved of his or her spiritual debts and also somewhat cleansed because unburdened of some measure of accumulated transgressions against the moral order of things.

Of course at this point I find myself wondering, am I really merely talking here of some universal emotion (named “guilt”, in English), which is just coped with in different ways in different cultural communities? Or do all these special aspects - the idea of spiritual debts and the practice of transferring one’s sins to others – suggest a different type of mental state? The first way of talking – “guilt” plus local coping strategy - surely is intellectually coherent; and the possibility that “guilt” might be unloaded in ways other than confession does seem, at the very least, imaginable.

The idea of “gifts” as transfers of “guilt” is coherent and intelligible, especially if one is prepared to assume three things. First, that the idea of “guilt” refers to an emotion caused or conditioned upon personal violations of the moral order or deviations from what one knows to be right, good or dutiful. Secondly, that wherever there are personal transgressions of the moral order there is also going be the mental experience of “guilt”, at least among “normal” human beings. Thirdly, that people may differ in their metaphysical beliefs.

For example, some peoples may classify the experience of “guilt” as a purely subjective mental event existing “only in the head”; while other peoples may have a different metaphysical view of the “same” experience. They may classify the experience of “guilt” as the concomitant of a special type of event called the occurrence of a “sin”. Such an event (a “sin”) may be understood to have an objective or “thing-like” nature with causal properties of its own, which can both weigh on your mind and influence your fate, until it is transferred to someone else. With regard to this example, of course, we may not subscribe to that particular metaphysical picture of the world, but that does not block us from understanding it. In fact, in this case we seem to have no difficulty making all three of the assumptions mentioned above, leading us to conclude that it is conceivable that “guilt” is coped with or managed in different ways in different parts of the world.
The application or use of the idea of “guilt” may not be the only way, or even the best way, to understand the mental life of Oriya Hindus in this instance. One might be tempted to argue in favor of an alternative approach in which differences between people in their metaphysical beliefs (e.g., the idea that “faults” are objective not subjective) are used as one of several ways to identify differences in mental states. Nevertheless, the interpretation of universal “guilt” plus culture-specific coping strategy is certainly imaginable.

Not all claims about cultural variations in “feelings and emotions” are so readily imaginable. For example, I find it impossible to make much sense of the statement “X particular emotion [for example, “sadness”] does not have the same meaning in the culture in which I work as it does in your culture.” Imagine an anthropologist comes back from years of field research and reports “Among the people I studied in the highlands of New Guinea ‘sadness’ is the good feeling people have when they manage to acquire the things they most want.” I find that statement incoherent because the idea of any particular emotion [for example, the idea of sadness] is what it is, and means what it means, and neither feeling good nor managing to acquire the things you most want is what “sadness” is about. In other words, the idea of (e.g.) “sadness” (that is, its meaning or definition) remains the same, regardless of where on the globe you happen to be when you find yourself thinking about it. The idea (its meaning and definition) remains the same regardless of whose mental life (a New Guinea Highlander’s or a Scotsman’s) one is trying to understand when one decides to put the idea of “sadness” to interpretive use. Whether and when one should be inclined to put an emotion concept (such as “sadness”) to use is quite another matter, to which I now turn.

The Use of Emotion Concepts in Comparative Research: A Misgiving

The idea of “sadness” can be used to illustrate some of the problems that arise if one uncritically adopts the theoretical language of “emotion” concepts as an analytic scheme for the comparative study of mental states (see Shweder 1993). The idea of “sadness”, at least as I understand it, can be roughly defined as follows (concerning the definition of “sadness” see Smedslund 1991 who discusses it as an example of “psychologic”; also Lazarus 1991 who individuates emotions such as “sadness” by their
“core relational themes”). “Sadness” refers to the particular way that a “normal person” will feel when the things he or she wants or likes are believed to be permanently unattainable or lost, and the distinctive way that a “normal person” acts when he or she has those beliefs and feelings.

Of course to actually arrive at an adequate specification of the idea of “sadness” those particulars and also some of the presuppositions of the definition would need to be filled in. At a minimum they would include all of the following. Among the particulars we would want to know something about the quality of the feelings that are experienced by “normal” people when the things they want or like are thought to be permanently unattainable (or lost). This might include a description of both their somatic feelings (e.g., feeling tired, “chilled”) and their affective feelings (e.g., feeling deflated, empty, passive, contracted). We would also want to know something about the quality of the actions towards which “normal” people incline (e.g., withdrawal from social interactions, ruminating about the futility of life) when they believe that the things they want or like have been lost forever. Among the various presuppositions of the definition is a utilitarian moral theory. Thus, it is presupposed by the very idea of “sadness” that human beings have wants and likes and that it is good for them to have the things they want and like.

Even this brief and superficial attempt at a definition of “sadness” suggests the richness and complexity of the meaning of a typical “emotion” concept. I have not even addressed the issue of whether the idea, concept or definition of “sadness” includes (or ought to include) a reference to non-mental (physiological, neurological, hormonal) states. Should our attempt at a definition of the idea of “sadness” also say “this is the way a ‘normal person’ feels, thinks and acts when their biological systems are in the following material states”, followed by a list of brain states, hormone levels, and so forth?

An even deeper analysis might try to show the way the idea of an emotion contains within itself the notion that human beings will be motivated by their feelings and desires to maintain the social order as a moral order. “Fear”, for example, is an idea associated with issues of safety and harm and the mental state it identifies is meant to motivate us to eliminate the conditions that produce that mental state by making our world safer. “Anger”, especially in the form of “indignation”, is associated with issues of fairness, equity and just desert and is meant to motivate us to eliminate injustice from the world.
“Love” and “compassion” are associated with protection of the vulnerable and are meant to motivate us to take care of others. Thus the semantic analysis of the idea of any particular “emotion” will reveal a good deal about the social, moral and mental world of any “normal human being” whose wants, feelings, beliefs and values are in fact packaged in that particular way.

But is it true that wherever you go in the world human mental life (decomposable into wants, feelings, beliefs and values) is in fact packaged that way (as “emotions”)? Which are the “emotionalized” packages of wants, feelings, beliefs and values that actually play a part in the mental life of this or that people? And how can we find out? This is where I start to get nervous about the privileging of our received “emotion” concepts in research on cultural psychology. I get nervous because I think it is very hard to answer those questions if one begins ones comparative research applying “emotions” as universally relevant theoretical categories. The prior adoption of such an analytic scheme makes it very difficult to ever conclude that the analytic scheme itself is either inappropriate or insufficiently revealing of the mental states of others.

Consider, for example, the observation made by several anthropologists about the way people in some cultures respond to apparent “loss” (such as the death of a child). They do not respond with visible or direct signs of “sadness” - no tears, no subjective reports of deflation, no predicted facial expressions, no mournful retreat from life, and no use of a word for a negative emotion. Rather they respond with “fatigue, sickness or other kinds of bodily distress” (such as backaches and headaches). In the light of such anthropological observations (for the sake of argument let us assume that they are reliable) what should we say about the mental life of such a people? What should we say about the cultural relevance of the particular package of wants, beliefs, feelings and values known as “sadness”?

Typically what happens in this case is that the theoretical idea of “sadness” is put to use, creatively generating various interpretive possibilities for making sense of what has been observed. The problem with this is that all the interpretations simply presuppose the relevance of the “idea of sadness”, leaving us with no empirical basis for examining the validity of that presupposition.
For example, one possible interpretation is the following. Something the “native” very much wanted has become permanently unattainable (a child has died); therefore, he or she must be mentally experiencing “sadness”. According to this interpretation there is no visible and direct manifestation of mental “sadness” because the “native” either denies being “sad”, psychologically defends against it (for example, by “somatizing” the mental state), or does not have a language or vocabulary for describing, communicating or expressing “sadness”; or any or all of the above. For those who elect to interpret things this way the “somatization” option is viewed as an unconscious psychological strategy or “defense” that makes it possible to retreat from daily life in a socially acceptable way (as “sick”) without having to acknowledge feelings of demoralization.

A second possible interpretation is that the “native” shows no visible or direct manifestation of “sadness” because the significance of the “eliciting event” is other than it seems. According to this interpretation the death of the child was not really appraised as a loss (for reasons yet to be discovered); hence there was no manifestation of “sadness” because there actually was no mental sadness in the first place. In other words, the set of things that might sadden the anthropologist are not necessarily coincidental with the set of things that might sadden the people whose behavior is being observed, whose mental states we are trying to infer, whose minds we are seeking to read.

A third possible interpretation is that something must be wrong with these “natives”. “Normal” human beings we suppose, here relying on our received theory of the “emotions”, are “saddened” to discover that the things they want and like have become permanently unobtainable. Various types of psychopathology might be suspected. A pathology of knowing (that something of great significance has been lost), a pathology of wanting (to have the things you like), a pathology of feeling (appropriate feelings), a pathology of valuing (the right sorts of things), and so forth.

From the point of view of making progress in the field of cultural psychology, I think there is something a little troubling when interpretation proceeds this way, although it is hard to say precisely what it is or to give the problem a name. Roughly stated I think the difficulty is this. Under the theoretical influence of the idea of “sadness” far too many “top-down” interpretations of the mental states of the “other” can be generated. And all of
these interpretations seem to presuppose the relevance of the idea of “sadness” without ever reconsidering that presupposition.

Moreover, the connection of actual evidence to any of these interpretations seems loose at best. The most manifest evidence, based on anthropological observation, suggests that apparent loss is not typically associated with “sadness” in some cultures, but rather with headaches or backaches or other forms of bodily distress. Nevertheless the relevance of the “emotion” concept to the case at hand is never doubted. And, given the range and types of possible interpretations generated under the influence of the idea of “sadness” it is not even apparent what would count as evidence that “sadness” is not the mental state of relevance in this case.

Imagine interviewing some apparently unsaddened “native” suffering from bodily aches and pains who, when asked, explicitly denies that the death of his or her child is a loss. Well, given that “denial” remains an interpretative option, we might certainly discount his or her testimony. On the other hand imagine the opposite. A “native” explicitly confirms appraising the death as a permanent loss of something that was wanted and highly valued, yet he or she gives no signs of the mental experience of “sadness”. Given the way “emotion” concepts work as analytic tools we are still free to assume he or she really is “sad”, or else suspect some form of pathology. Notice that once we have presupposed the relevance of the idea of “sadness” actual self-reports about wants, feelings, beliefs and values appear to be neither necessary nor sufficient as evidence for or against our interpretations. But what conceivable evidence would convince us that it is possible for a “normal person” in another culture to lose something they truly want and value without automatically activating the mental state we identify with the idea of “sad”? As far as I can tell this entire exercise in “mind reading” the mental state of others in the circumstance described is constrained primarily by one’s prior commitment to the idea of “sadness” as a basic theoretical category for making sense of the mental life of all human beings. That seems to me a problem, because we seem to be blocked from ever even imagining that there might be other ways for “normal” human beings to package their wants, feelings, beliefs and values.
Putting the “Emotions” to the Side in Cultural Psychology.

One of the several aims of cultural psychology as a discipline is to develop a language for the comparative study of mental states that makes it possible to understand and appreciate the mental life of “others”. “Others” refers to members of some different cultural community who by virtue of life long membership in that group ascribe meaning to their lives in the light of wants, feelings, values and beliefs that are not necessarily the same as ones own. Following Wierzbicka’s (1999) proposal one might suggest that wants, feelings, values (evaluating things as good or bad) and beliefs be taken as fundamental or basic to the mental life of peoples in all cultures, indeed as constituent elements of what it means to have a mental life. Wanting, feeling, knowing, and valuing (as good or bad) would thus circumscribe cultural psychology’s “theory of mind.” But what about the “emotions”?

Setting aside the “emotions” in cultural psychology really amounts to decomposing the “emotions” into more elementary or constituent meanings, for example, of the type proposed by Wierzbicka and Goddard. In earlier work of my own (Shweder 1994; Shweder and Haidt 1999; also see Menon and Shweder 1994) it has been proposed that the idea of an “emotion” (e.g., sadness, fear, anger, envy, disgust or love) is a complex. It is not something separable from the conditions that justify it, from the somatic and affective experiences that are ways of being touched by it, from the actions it demands, etc. The emotion is the whole story. It is a kind of somatic event (fatigue, chest pain) and affective event (panic, emptiness, expansiveness). It is caused by the perception of some antecedent condition (e.g., death of a friend) and by the recognition of the personal implications of the event for the self (e.g., loss, gain, threat, goal blockage, degradation or elevation of status). This motivates a plan for action (e.g., attack, withdraw, hide, confess, celebrate) to preserve or enhance one's sense of identity and purpose in life. The idea of an “emotion” is about the entire mental, moral and social episode. It is about the unitary experience of the whole package deal or the simultaneous experience of all the components of meaning.

For analytic purposes and for the sake of cross-cultural research on the universality versus culture-specificity of human mental states, I thus suggested that it might be helpful to decompose the idea of an “emotion” into various components of meaning. Many other
theorists have done so as well (Ekman 1980, 1984; Ellsworth 1991; Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Russell 1991; Scherer, Walbott and Summerfield 1986). Paul Ekman, for example, talks of antecedent events, appraisal, behavioral response, physiology and expression. I like to ask whether different members of different cultural groups are alike or different in mental functioning in this broad domain by dividing that question into several more specific ones, focusing on the following seven components of the meaning of an “emotion”.

1. **Environmental determinants:** Are members of different cultural groups alike or different in the antecedent conditions of the world (e.g., job loss, violating a rule) that elicit somatic and affective feelings? This is about what people “know”.

2. **Self-Appraisal:** Are members of different cultural groups alike or different in the perceived implications of those antecedent conditions for their personal identity and projects in life (e.g., status loss, fame, goal-blockage)? This is about what people “want”, “know”, and “value”.

3. **Somatic phenomenology:** Are members of different cultural groups alike or different in their somatic reactions (e.g., muscle tension, headaches) to 1 and 2 above? This is about what people “feel”.

4. **Affective phenomenology:** Are members of different cultural groups alike or different in their affective reactions (e.g., feelings of emptiness, calm, expansiveness) to 1 and 2 above. This is also about what people “feel”.

5. **Social appraisal:** Are members of different cultural groups alike or different in the extent to which displaying those somatic and affective reactions has been socially baptized a vice or virtue or a sign of sickness or health. This is about what people “value”.

6. **Self-management:** Are members of different cultural groups alike or different in the plans for self-management (e.g., attack, withdraw, hide, confess, transfer of sins) that are activated as part of an action routine? This is about what people “want”, “know” and “value”.
7. Communication: Are members of different cultural groups alike or different in the iconic or symbolic vehicles (e.g., facial expressions, voice quality, posture) for expressing the whole package of interconnected components (1-6 above)?

If we proceed this way, deconstructing the “emotions” and temporarily setting them aside as analytic or theoretical categories, it certainly seems possible that certain wants, feelings, beliefs and values might be universal and similarly packaged together in all cultures. Many researchers will be betting on “anger”, “fear” and “sadness” as mental states (each consisting of a complex but unique way of packaging wants, feelings, beliefs and values) that are readily synthesized and available to all “normal” human beings. It also seems possible, however, indeed likely, that not all wants, feelings, beliefs and values are shared across cultures or packaged together in the same way everywhere. There may well be many culture-specific “emotions”, that is to say, co-activations of particular wants, feelings, values and beliefs that play a part and are significant in the mental lives of members of some cultures but not others. It is precisely because these are things to be discovered rather than presupposed that I am sympathetic to the view that “emotion” concepts should not, at least for the moment, be part of the basic theoretical language of cultural psychology?

Work in medical anthropology focused primarily on what I would call “feelings” (what they call “sensations and symptoms”) rather than on “emotions” per se, has uncovered several culture-specific co-activations of the sort I have in mind. For example, Hinton and Hinton (in press; also Hinton, Um and Ba 2001) have examined what they refer to as the “sore-neck syndrome” (“rooy go”) among Khmer Cambodian populations. Their research is in the broad territory of anxiety experiences, feelings of “panic” and autonomic arousal. For Khmer Cambodians that experience is associated with a cluster of feelings and sensations including dizziness, ringing in the ears, blurred vision, joint pains, muscle aches, shoulder and neck soreness as well as anxieties about death. None of those feelings, sensations or “symptoms” is a universal feature of autonomic arousal or “panic attacks”. During such mental episodes Khmer Cambodians also experience palpitations, shortness of breath and profuse perspiration. As Hinton and Hinton point out, not all
populations of peoples in the world are prone to “motion-sickness” (for example, on a boat or in a car) or dizziness (for example, when quickly standing up) to the same degree. Human physiology is not uniform around the world and there is probably no reason to assume a priori that all populations of peoples have identical feelings under equivalent circumstances. Among Khmer Cambodians, however, there is also a well-developed cultural conceptualization of human physiology (which appears to have its origins in South Asian medical theories about the “humors” of the body). And it may play a part in how they feel, think and react when they “panic.”

Here I recapitulate Hinton and Hinton (In press, pp. 14-15) on how “each symptom of autonomic arousal will be appraised and apperceived given the local ethnophysiology.” “Wind” is one of the humors of the body and the prototypical symptom of wind is “dizziness.” As the Hintons note “…the complaint of dizziness, immediately indicating wind illness, implies a complex physiology.” Khmer Cambodians believe, the Hintons note, that excessive “wind” can be caused by poor diet, little sleep or by wind penetrating the pores of the body. “If there is too much wind in the body, often the vessels carrying wind and blood become acutely blocked, especially at the knees and elbows, preventing outward flow along the limbs. The obstruction is said to cause hand and foot coldness, numbness, weakness, and muscle aches as well…it is thought that permanent limb paralysis may result from this tubal obstruction. Furthermore, according to the Khmer ethnophysiology, if wind is blocked at the limb joints, it tends to reverse its flow and surge toward the neck and head, possibly rupturing the neck vessels as well as causing a pressure increase at the head. Moreover, wind is said to shoot out the ears causing the ears to ring; and some patients describe dizziness as resulting from an actual spinning of brain matter.”

One could go on – wind impeding breathing, compressing the heart, and then rushing to the head, “coining” as one of several measures to reduce the pressure of wind and alleviate the feeling of dizziness – but I hope the point has been made. Research of this type points us in the direction of a cultural psychology of mental states that is “bottom-up” (starts with wants, feelings, beliefs and values) rather than “top-down” (starts with the idea of “emotions”). It begins with the documentation of how particular wants,
feelings, beliefs and values get linked or co-occur during actual mental events or mental episodes in particular populations.

That is not to say that there are no universal “emotions”. It is to say that particular “emotion” concepts should be introduced into the theoretical language for comparative research on human mental states only after they have been induced and convincingly shown to be empirical universals. It won’t do to simply presume the universal usefulness of particular “emotion” concepts, or to design research projects that offer no way to displace that assumption. It won’t do to rely on judgments of bilingual informants or on dictionaries for evidence on the mental life of people in other cultures. One way to get from here to there might be to follow Anna Wierzbicka’s and Cliff Goddard’s analytic proposal, adding to it an inductive step in which we actually document the distribution of particular wants, feelings, beliefs and values across mental events or mental episodes in different cultural groups. To even contemplate that step is fairly mind-boggling and it reveals how far we have to go. It will require the development of an approach to the sampling of actual mental events or episodes across a sample of cultural groups, which is representative of the major cultural regions of the world. It will require the interdisciplinary coordination of techniques and methods (from linguistics, ethology, ethnography, psychology, and biology) for assessing wants, feelings, beliefs and values, including their content, and to do so “on-line” or in ecologically valid ways. Fortunately, this is a great moment for the coordination of interdisciplinary research in the area of “feelings and emotions”, and many of us are eager to take the step.
Notes

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1. The idea of “true” and “false” (not “true”) are also semantically simple, intuitively obvious, readily available universal folk concepts. I use the term “beliefs” throughout this essay to refer to the universal condition of thinking that one knows that something is true. I also assume for the sake of the argument that the “something” can be represented in the form of a proposition about “the world”. “Beliefs”, at least by my account, should thus be part of any theoretical language for comparative research on mental states.
References


