



Moral judgments in social dilemmas: How bad is free riding? ☆

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ABSTRACT

In the last thirty years, economists and other social scientists have investigated people's normative views on distributive justice. Here we study people's normative views in social dilemmas, which underlie many situations of economic and social significance. Using insights from moral philosophy and psychology we provide an analysis of the morality of free riding. We use experimental survey methods to investigate people's moral judgments empirically. We vary others' contributions, the framing ("give-some" versus "take-some") and whether contributions are simultaneous or sequential. We find that moral judgments of a free rider depend strongly on others' behaviour; and that failing to give is condemned more strongly than withdrawing all support.

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1. Introduction

Prominent among Amartya Sen's many enduring contributions are his arguments for enrichment of the concept of agency used in economic analysis and of the information base of welfare economics.¹ Although these arguments suggest that an individual's normative views may be relevant both to the explanation of her behaviour and to her evaluations of states of affairs, they also suggest that it may be hard to infer normative views directly from choice behaviour.

A striking recent development in public economics, reflecting this difficulty, has been the increasing use of data on people's normative attitudes obtained with surveys or questionnaires. For example, views about distributive justice and redistributive policy have been examined by Fong (2001), Gaertner et al. (2001), Corneo and Grüner (2002), Faravelli (2007), Gaertner and Schwettmann (2007), and Corneo and Fong (2008).² In this paper, we extend the empirical investigation of normative views to a different economic context, namely social dilemma (public goods) games, and a different type of normative view, namely moral judgment.³ More specifically, we report an experiment that, using techniques adapted from moral

psychology, explores how people judge the morality of a free rider in a social dilemma game.

A social dilemma arises when members of a group share the benefits of a common resource but each has to decide individually how much to contribute to its provision. Contribution is costly to the contributor but helps all other group members. Thus, a social dilemma isolates a conflict between personal interest, which militates for free riding, and collective interest, which requires contribution. The ubiquity of social dilemmas makes them important for economics and social science; and the conflict of interest they embody makes them potentially fruitful ground for the empirical study of moral judgments. In fact, there are arguments to the effect that the conception of morality itself evolved in response to cooperation problems our ancestors faced.⁴

Previous research has shown that people experience negative emotions towards free riders in social dilemmas and that some are willing to incur costs to punish them.⁵ However, little is known about people's moral judgment of free riders. Although it seems that many people dislike free riders when directly affected by their behaviour, it does not follow that free riding is viewed as *morally* reprehensible. Croson and Konow (2009) provide evidence of a difference between normative judgments reached from the standpoints of "stakeholder" and impartial observer in dictator games; and the same difference could apply in social dilemmas. We ask: when judgment is not confounded with self-interest from being an affected party, is free

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¹ See, for example, the essays collected in Sen (1982a, 2002).

² See Konow (2003) and Gaertner (2009) for overviews.

³ Moral judgments can be "defined as evaluations (good versus bad) of the actions or character of a person that are made with respect to a set of virtues held to be obligatory by a culture or subculture" (Haidt (2001), p. 817).

⁴ E.g. Ridley (1996), Binmore (2005), Hauser (2006), Gintis et al. (2008), Krebs (2008).

⁵ E.g. Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), Cubitt et al. (2008), Gächter and Herrmann (2009).

riding still judged to be wrong? And, if so, what factors influence how severe a transgression it is seen as?

In our study, subjects ($n = 538$) were confronted with hypothetical scenarios involving a two-player public goods game in which one player free rides. For each scenario, subjects were asked to express their positive or negative moral rating of the free rider, without themselves being involved in the decision situation. As they were merely observers, their judgments should represent impartial moral evaluations.

Our experimental design manipulates three aspects of the scenarios. First, we manipulate the behaviour of the non-judged player to see whether subjects' moral judgments of the free rider depend on this. Our second manipulation investigates how moral judgments depend on the order of moves in the scenarios. In particular, we explore whether the sensitivity of judgments of the free rider to the action of the non-judged player is affected by whether the free rider knew the other player's behaviour when choosing his own. Third, we explore whether moral judgments are sensitive to contextual cues provided by the framing of the decision problem. The framing manipulation we study has a Give versus Take form. This manipulation is common in studies of social dilemma games,⁶ but its impact on moral judgments in that context has not been studied before, to our knowledge.

We find that free riding is perceived as a morally blameworthy action in all our scenarios, except for one case in which it is seen as morally praiseworthy. The exceptional case is the one, which we will call "ratting on a rat", in which the judged free rider moves second, after observing that the other player has free ridden too. We provide evidence that, irrespective of whether moves are simultaneous or sequential, the higher is the other player's contribution, the more negative is the moral rating assigned to the free rider on average. Interestingly, this pattern of judgments is also observed at an individual level for a substantial minority of subjects in the simultaneous case and for an overwhelming majority in the sequential case. Finally, we find a strong framing effect in moral evaluations: other things equal, subjects condemn withdrawing support from the public good less than the corresponding equivalent action of failing to contribute to it.

We see these findings as a contribution not just to economics but also to the emerging literature in moral psychology and empirical moral philosophy (Haidt, 2001; Nichols, 2004, Haidt 2007, Nado et al. 2009). This literature investigates how people arrive at moral judgments in a number of contexts. By extending it to cover free riding in social dilemmas, we make a contribution that is both conceptual and empirical. We analyse a typical experimental social dilemma problem from the perspectives of two accounts of how people form moral judgments: the reason-based model and the emotion-based model. Although our experimental design is not intended to test between those models, each model provides a distinct framework for analysing how our experimental manipulations may affect moral judgments. We explain this in Section 3, after describing our main design features in Section 2. Section 4 gives details of experimental procedures. Finally, Section 5 presents, and Section 6 discusses, our empirical results.⁷

2. Experimental design: scenarios and treatments

In our experiment, each subject responded to a questionnaire requiring her to report her moral judgment of a player in hypothetical

⁶ See, for example, Brewer and Kramer (1986), McDaniel and Sistrunk (1991), Andreoni (1995), McCusker and Carnevale (1995), Sell and Son (1997), Sonnemans et al. (1998); Park (2000), van Dijk and Wilke (2000), Rege and Telle (2004) and Dufwenberg et al. (2010).

⁷ For readers more interested in the empirical contribution than the conceptual one, it is possible to skip or skim Section 3, though doing so carries a cost in terms of understanding parts of Section 6.

scenarios. There were four treatments, each defined by a different questionnaire. Each subject responded to the questionnaire for one treatment only.

Each questionnaire described a decision problem for two fictitious players, named Person A and Person B; and then gave some possible endings, each of which specified players' choices and their consequences. A scenario comprises a description of a decision problem and an ending. Each questionnaire consisted of five scenarios with the same decision problem, but different endings.

In all scenarios, the players were the two members of a group playing a public good game. Within each questionnaire, the behaviour of Person A varied across scenarios but Person B was always a complete free rider. After each ending, the subject was asked, as a detached observer, to rate the morality of Person B on a scale ranging from -50 (extremely bad) to $+50$ (extremely good). Thus, in each treatment, we can test within-subjects for the impact of the behaviour of the non-judged player on the moral rating assigned to the free rider. All other tests are between-subjects and involve comparisons of subjects' responses across treatments.

There were two treatment variables: the framing used to describe the decision problem; and the order of moves in that problem. Each variable had two possible values: "Give" and "Take" for framing; and "Simultaneous" and "Sequential" for order of moves. Each was manipulated independently, yielding four treatments: Give-Simultaneous, Take-Simultaneous, Give-Sequential, and Take-Sequential.

To explain the Give versus Take manipulation, we fix on the Simultaneous order of moves. In the Give frame, the decision facing each player was how much to contribute to a group project; in the Take frame, it was how much to withdraw. The first scenarios in the Give-Simultaneous and Take-Simultaneous treatments are shown in the left-hand and right-hand columns below respectively. (To show the difference between them, we present corresponding Give and Take scenarios side by side here, using bold face for each phrase which differs from the corresponding one in the other framing. However, bold face was not used for these passages when scenarios were presented to subjects and, as explained above, no subject saw both frames).

Give-Simultaneous	Take-Simultaneous
<p>Imagine a group that consists of two group members, Person A and Person B. Each group member receives an endowment of 20 tokens and has to decide how many tokens to keep for himself and how many to contribute to a group project. Each token he keeps for himself has a value of one pound for him. Each token contributed to the group project has a value of £1.50 to the project. The total value of the project is divided equally between the two group members. So, each token contributed to the project earns both group members £0.75 each. The total income of a group member is the sum earned from tokens kept for himself and his share of the earnings of the group project. Each group member decides simultaneously, that is, without knowing what the other one has done.</p> <p>A) Assume that Person A contributes 0 tokens to the group project and Person B contributes 0 tokens to the group project. Therefore, the value of the group project is £0 and, thus, as a result of their contributions, Person A's total income is £20 and Person B's total income is £20.</p>	<p>Imagine a group that consists of two group members, Person A and Person B. There are 40 tokens in a group project. Each group member has to decide how many, up to a maximum of 20, of these tokens to withdraw for himself and how many to leave in the group project. Each token he withdraws for himself has a value of one pound for him. Each token left in the group project has a value of £1.50 to the project. The total value of the project is divided equally between the two group members. So, each token left in the project earns both group members £0.75 each. The total income of a group member is the sum earned from tokens withdrawn by himself and his share of the earnings of the group project. Each group member decides simultaneously, that is, without knowing what the other one has done.</p> <p>A) Assume that Person A withdraws 20 tokens from the group project and Person B withdraws 20 tokens from the group project. Therefore, the value of the group project is £0 and, thus, as a result of their withdrawals, Person A's total income is £20 and Person B's total income is £20.</p>

The scenarios within each questionnaire differed from each other only in Person A's behaviour. In the Give-Simultaneous treatment,

Person A's contribution was 0 tokens (as shown) in the first scenario, rising to 20 in increments of 5 over the other four scenarios. In the Take-Simultaneous treatment, Person A's withdrawal was 20 tokens (as shown) in the first scenario, declining to 0 in decrements of 5 over the other four scenarios. In all scenarios, the last sentence specified the incomes to Person A and Person B resulting from their joint behaviour; and then the subject was asked "*How do you rate **Person B's morality?***" (bold face in original).

The Give and Take frames differ only in the description of the scenarios. There is no difference in terms of the feasible sets of monetary outcomes available to a player in corresponding scenarios. In each frame, each player controlled the final destination of 20 tokens, each of which could be allocated either to himself (earning £1 for him) or to the project (earning £0.75 for each player). In view of this, we use the term "effective contribution" below to refer to the tokens allocated by a player to the project, regardless of whether this was by means of contributing or not withdrawing.

In addition to the Simultaneous treatments, we ran two treatments (one with the Give frame, and one with Take) in which the non-judged player moved first. Each questionnaire for these Sequential treatments was obtained from the corresponding Simultaneous one by replacing the last sentence of the first paragraph with "Assume that Person A decides first and Person B observes Person A's choice before making his own decision." In all other respects, Sequential questionnaires were identical to the corresponding Simultaneous ones.

3. Discussion of design from the perspective of moral psychology and philosophy

The philosophical and psychological literatures suggest two broad accounts of how individuals might arrive at their moral judgments which, for convenience, we call the *reason-based model* and the *emotion-based model*, respectively.⁸

The reason-based model sees an individual's moral judgments as the result of deliberation in which the prior moral principles she endorses are applied to the case at hand. On this account, hypotheses about how subjects' judgments will vary across scenarios would be conditional on assumptions about their prior moral principles and, in particular, about whether those principles imply that the differences between our scenarios are morally relevant.

In contrast, the emotion-based model sees emotions and intuitions as the drivers of moral judgments. On this view, moral judgments express sentiments, caused by quickly-formed moral intuitions which may be followed by *ex post* moral reasoning.⁹ On the emotion-based model, whether and how far subjects report different judgments across scenarios would depend on whether there are differences in the nature and intensity of the emotional responses cued by them.

To facilitate our discussion of how our experimental manipulations would be seen by these two models of judgment, we begin by giving names to certain hypotheses.

We refer to the view that moral judgments are insensitive to the Give versus Take manipulation as the *frame insensitivity hypothesis*.

Correspondingly, the *independence hypothesis* asserts that the moral rating of Person B is independent of Person A's effective contribution. Note that the independence hypothesis could hold in

either Simultaneous or Sequential treatments, but (as we will see) the arguments that would motivate it in the two cases may be different. If the independence hypothesis holds under one order of moves, but not the other, this would induce a difference between Sequential and Simultaneous treatments for some otherwise identical scenarios.

If judgments of Person B are sensitive to Person A's effective contribution, it seems most likely that this will take the form that the higher is Person A's effective contribution, the less favourable is the moral rating assigned to Person B. We refer to this as the *increasing condemnation hypothesis*. We focus on this (potential) direction of effect as, although Person B's effective contribution is always 0 tokens, the effective contribution of Person A rises across the successive endings of each questionnaire, leading to outcomes that are progressively less favourable to Person A and more favourable to Person B, both in relative and absolute terms. Each increment of 5 tokens in Person A's effective contribution reduces Person A's monetary payoff by £1.25, while increasing that of Person B by £3.75. Thus, although each player receives £20 in the first scenario of each questionnaire, by the last scenario, Person A receives £15 and Person B £35.

3.1. The reason-based model

The implications of the reason-based model depend on the prior ethical principles that subjects endorse and, especially, on whether these are consequentialist.¹⁰

For a *consequentialist* ethical theory, the moral value of an action derives from comparison of its consequences with other feasible ones; so re-describing the decision problem, holding actual and feasible consequences constant, should have no impact on the moral value of the action. Thus, if our subjects endorse any form of consequentialism that sees the morally relevant consequences in our scenarios as determined by the monetary outcomes, the reason-based model predicts that the frame insensitivity hypothesis will hold. For the remainder of the paper, by "consequentialism" we intend a form of the doctrine that has this implication.¹¹ Thus, if we observe a difference between judgments in the Give and Take frames, the reason-based model would have to interpret it as evidence of subjects endorsing prior ethical principles that are not consequentialist in the sense just described.

The consequentialist argument for frame insensitivity requires the morally relevant consequences of Person B's free riding to be determined by the monetary outcomes, but it does not depend on how broadly those outcomes are construed.

If they take a *narrow* view, subjects could see the consequences of Person B's action as consisting only of the payments determined by the tokens in his own control. This would imply that the "consequence" of Person B making an effective contribution of zero tokens is the same across *all* scenarios. Then, in addition to frame insensitivity, the independence hypothesis would hold in Simultaneous treatments, and in Sequential treatments, and with no difference between Simultaneous and Sequential.

However, if subjects take a *broad* view and see the consequences of Person B's free riding as including all monetary payments that arise in a given scenario, the independence hypothesis might fail (at least in

⁸ The reason-based model can be seen as a descendent of rationalist traditions in philosophy associated with Descartes, Leibniz and Kant. (However, it is important that what we call here the reason-based model does not require agents to endorse Kantian moral principles.) The emotion-based model has more affinity with naturalistic traditions in philosophy associated with Hume and Smith. For more recent discussions of the philosophical and psychological background on moral judgments, see e.g., Haidt (2001), Nichols (2004), Doris and Stich (2005), Hauser (2006), Joyce (2006), Prinz (2006, 2007), Krebs (2008), Sinnott-Armstrong (2008), DeScioli and Kurzban (2009), Nado et al. (2009).

⁹ For experimental evidence, see Greene et al. (2001) and Wheatley and Haidt (2005). For overviews, see Haidt (2001); Greene and Haidt (2002) and Haidt (2007).

¹⁰ Blackburn (2008), p. 74, defines consequentialism as the view that the "value of an action derives entirely from its consequences". For an extensive philosophical discussion, see Sinnott-Armstrong (2006); for a discussion from an economic point of view see Sen (1987).

¹¹ When faced with counter-examples, a possible defensive move for advocates of consequentialism might reinterpret consequences to include factors previously not seen as part of them. If "contributing no tokens" and "withdrawing 20 tokens" are interpreted as acts with different consequences, perhaps because only one leads to the "consequence" that a withdrawal has been made, then a framing effect in our design would be compatible with subjects making consequentialist judgments, in the reinterpreted sense. However, taken to the limit, this reinterpretation strategy risks abolishing any distinction between an action and its consequences, so rendering consequentialism trivial.

Sequential treatments). For example, it would be consistent with a broad view for the difference between (or ratio of) the payoffs to each player to be seen as a morally relevant feature of the consequences of Person B's free riding. If subjects are consequentialist in the broad sense, and averse to unequal outcomes, this creates the potential for the increasing condemnation hypothesis to hold. Any increase in Person A's effective contribution tilts relative payoffs (further) in Person B's favour, if Person B continues to free ride. If this is seen as an undesirable outcome, then the obligation on Person B to avoid it may strengthen; and, if so, one would expect Person B to be condemned more strongly for continuing to free ride. Thus, broad consequentialism can generate, out of an attitude towards unequal outcomes, a view that Person B ought to match Person A's effective contribution. If subjects reason in this way, one might expect the increasing condemnation hypothesis to hold in Sequential treatments, since Person B must be held responsible for (what a broad consequentialist sees as) the different, and known, consequences of his actions across the five scenarios in a Sequential treatment.

It is harder to formulate moral principles that rationalise conformity with the increasing condemnation hypothesis in Simultaneous treatments, as they would have to license condemning Person B differently, given different effective contributions by Person A, even though Person B is neither responsible for nor knows Person A's choice. We will call the principle that an agent cannot be condemned on the basis of matters which he neither controls nor knows the *responsibility doctrine*. If subjects endorse this principle then, even if they are otherwise inclined to view consequences broadly, the independence hypothesis would hold in Simultaneous treatments.

However, there are ethical views which violate the responsibility doctrine and might account for increasing condemnation even in Simultaneous treatments. At first sight, this may seem a strange property for moral principles. But, within a broad consequentialist framework, rationalisation for it can be found in the doctrine of *moral luck*, discussed by Nagel (1976) and Williams (1981).

According to this doctrine, an agent *can* be blamed for outcomes of their actions to which chance, or other matters outside their control, have contributed. As an example, Nagel argues that a driver who has negligently failed to check his brakes "would *have* to blame himself" (emphasis added) much more if a child runs into the road and is killed than if no situation arises which requires sharp braking, even though his negligence is the same in each case, and he neither predicted nor had any control over the child's action. By analogy, in the current context, one might see it as bad moral luck for Person B if Person A makes a non-zero effective contribution, so turning his own free riding into *unilateral* free riding (and worse moral luck the higher is Person A's effective contribution). Then, the moral luck doctrine would license blaming Person B more, as Person A's effective contribution rises.

Finally, note that there is nothing in the reason-based model that requires subjects to be consequentialist. If subjects endorse deontological moral principles instead, then the reason-based model predicts that they would apply those principles to form their judgments. *Deontological* views see the moral status of an action as flowing, not from its consequences, but from its intrinsic properties. For example, it might be seen as intrinsically wrong to commit murder even if, by some bizarre twist of fate, one could bring about net beneficial consequences by doing so.

In our context, if the intrinsic properties of Person B's free riding are to be distinguished from consequences, it seems inevitable that they can take no account of Person A's action when Person B is unaware of it. Thus, deontological forms of the reason-based model would lead us to expect the independence hypothesis to hold in Simultaneous treatments.

Whether it would also hold in Sequential treatments would depend on whether the intrinsic properties of Person B's free riding are sensitive to Person A's choice, when that is known to Person B. If

not (for example, because free riding is seen as intrinsically and unconditionally wrong) then the independence hypothesis would be expected to hold in Sequential treatments, as well as in Simultaneous. But, a different view might rationalise increasing condemnation, for example if taking revenge on Person A when he has free ridden, or failing to reward him when he has contributed, are seen as intrinsic properties of Person B's free riding in different scenarios. If the former is morally acceptable but the latter is not then this view would require the increasing condemnation hypothesis, but only in Sequential treatments.

Finally, if withdrawing and withholding support are seen as intrinsically different actions, application of deontological moral principles could also account for frame sensitivity of judgments of the free rider.

3.2. The emotion-based model

On the emotion-based model, it is not necessary to delve into such tricky terrain to account for violations of frame insensitivity and/or the independence hypothesis, because the model does not require moral judgments to flow from coherent principles. Instead, it sees them as cued by emotional responses to the scenario as a whole.

Evolutionary theorists argue that moral judgments may be situation-specific and frame-dependent (e.g., Krebs, 2008, p. 116). Consistent with this argument, the emotion-based model suggests that subjects' judgments would be driven by gut-reactions to whole scenarios which, in turn, may be sensitive to seemingly incidental features of them. For example, the emotional response to a player whose effective contribution is zero might differ according to whether this free riding arises from complete failure to contribute to the project or from maximal withdrawal of support from it. This is possible even though the consequences are the same, and even in the absence of a prior ethical theory that licenses the distinction.

Similarly, it is easy to imagine how Person A's choice might affect a subject's emotional response to a scenario in which Person B free rides, even when their choices are simultaneous. The subject might be more angered, or disgusted, or saddened, by a scenario in which Person B free rides the larger is Person A's effective contribution. For example, negative emotional responses to payoff inequality or to inequality of contributions could bring this about.

Although it is possible that emotional responses would vary between Simultaneous and Sequential versions of otherwise identical scenarios, the emotion-based model need not confine the increasing condemnation hypothesis to the Sequential treatment, since emotional responses are responses to the whole scenario. Gino et al. (2009) provide evidence of an outcome bias in ethical judgment. Such a bias arises when the assessment of an action is influenced by *ex post* information about its outcome that was not available to the decision-maker. In our context, a similar bias might take the form of Person B being condemned most strongly when it turns out his free riding was unilateral, even though he did not know that at the moment of choice. This would lead one to expect conformity with the increasing condemnation hypothesis in Simultaneous treatments, use of the word "bias" indicating that, on this view, there need be no principled justification for the phenomenon.

Table 1 summarises the discussion of this section. For each of the two models of moral judgment, the Table indicates the factors that would determine whether, and how, manipulation of the framing of the decision problem and of the non-judged player's behaviour should affect judgments of Person B's free riding. (For manipulation of Player A's choice, we distinguish between Sequential and Simultaneous treatments.) A bullet-point saying that the framing of the decision problem has "No effect, if..." indicates assumptions under which the frame insensitivity hypothesis should hold. Similarly, a bullet-point saying that Player A's choice has "No effect if..." indicates assumptions under which the independence hypothesis should hold.

Table 1
Analysis of impact of manipulations on moral judgments.

	Description	Impact of		
		Framing of decision problem	Player A's choice (Sequential treatments)	Player A's choice (Simultaneous treatments)
Reason-based model (following rationalist tradition in moral philosophy)	Judgments arise from application of prior moral principles to case in hand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No effect, if principles are consequentialist Frame sensitivity possible if principles are deontological and intrinsic properties of not giving and taking are different. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No effect, if principles are narrow consequentialist. Increasing condemnation possible, if principles are broad consequentialist. If principles are deontological, depends whether intrinsic properties of B's free riding are sensitive to A's choice. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No effect if principles are narrow consequentialist or deontological. If principles are broad consequentialist, depends whether subjects endorse responsibility doctrine or moral luck doctrine.
Emotions-based model, (following naturalistic tradition in moral philosophy and psychology)	Judgments arise from instinctive emotional reactions to case in hand, which may be rationalised by <i>ex post</i> reasoning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No effect, if Give and Take frames cue same emotions. Frame sensitivity possible if Give and Take frames cue different emotions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No effect, if emotions are unaffected by A's choice. Increasing condemnation possible if effective contribution by A cues negative emotions towards free rider. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No effect, if emotions are unaffected by A's choice. Increasing condemnation possible if effective contribution by A cues negative emotions towards free rider.

4. Procedures

We recruited participants from among University of Nottingham students using the ORSEE software (Greiner (2004)). In total, we sent 2718 email invitations, resulting in 538 participants. Once a subject registered to take part, they were directed to the experiment's website and allocated automatically to one of the four treatments, in a rotating sequence by time of registration for the experiment.

Each subject saw only the questionnaire for the treatment they were assigned to. They could either respond to it immediately or exit or return to it any time before the closing date of the experiment (which was one week after invitations were sent). Subjects returning later could still only see the questionnaire they had been assigned to initially. Subjects were omitted from the data analysis if they failed to complete a questionnaire by the closing date.¹² To counter the possibility of multiple submissions from the same subject, only one registration was permitted from a given invitation. By using and extending ORSEE recruitment software, rather than employing an open internet experiment, we were able to build in this safeguard and to insure that no invitees had been recruited to previous public goods experiments.

It is inherent to our study that we could not incentivise task-responses, but we could incentivise participation. We comment on these features in turn.

Our objective was to study subjects' impartial moral attitudes.¹³ A questionnaire-based approach was appropriate for this purpose because any means of tying payments to subjects' responses would introduce a potential confound.¹⁴ In particular, we wished to elicit judgments that subjects would give in the role of a disinterested observer. This precluded having subjects be participants in the public goods game: hence our use of hypothetical scenarios. Allowing subjects to assign financial penalties or rewards to the players in the

scenarios, even hypothetically, would have confounded moral attitudes with attempts to bring about particular distributional consequences: hence our use of pure judgment tasks rather than – say – reward or punishment tasks. As our judgment tasks are moral judgment tasks, as opposed – say – to mathematical puzzles or judgments of distance, there are no objectively “right” or “wrong” answers to them. So, we could not reward subjects for judging correctly. Finally, rewarding subjects for making judgments that conform to particular ethical theories, or to our own ethical views, or to average opinion, would all have introduced obvious biases, relative to the motivation for our experiment. Our aim was to elicit subjects' own actual judgements, not their beliefs about which judgments would be rewarded or are held by others.¹⁵

Given the absence of task-related incentives, we felt that it might be difficult to generate a sufficient number of participants, without some participation incentive. On the other hand, having a substantial reward for participation might have attracted subjects unwilling to give considered responses and only willing to do the minimum necessary to obtain the reward. It might also disproportionately attract people for whom pecuniary concerns are particularly important. In the light of these considerations, we used two approaches in parallel. Prior to issuing invitations, we divided our potential subject pool randomly into two equal sub-groups: one for which there would be no payments at all (“No-Payment experiment”) and one in which a random participation fee was provided (“Payment” experiment), in the form of entry to a lottery. The latter provided some protection against low participation, while conducting both experiments enabled us to check for any effect of the participation incentive on task-responses.¹⁶

5. Results

Before turning to our main questions, we consider the impact of the different participation incentive schemes on participation and

¹² This resulted in the following number of participants: Give-Simultaneous – 135; Take-Simultaneous – 138; Give-Sequential – 128; and Take-Sequential – 137.

¹³ For interesting discussions of impartiality in ethical reasoning, see Sen (1993, 2009).

¹⁴ The use of non-incentivised surveys and questionnaire-based experiments is standard in the study of mental states and social attitudes. For example, the recent literature on self-reported happiness (see Clark et al., 2008, for a survey and the August 2008 *Journal of Public Economics* symposium for recent examples) relies on non-incentivised responses, as do surveys of attitudes such as the World Values Survey (<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>). Similar methods have been used to study preferences for redistribution and perceptions of fairness by Kahneman et al. (1986), Anand (2001), and Gächter and Riedl (2006), as well as the papers mentioned in the first paragraph of Section 1.

¹⁵ See Krupka and Weber (2008) for an experiment where people are rewarded for guessing which norms other people hold. Their interest is in eliciting what people think the social norm is whereas we are interested in the individual's own moral judgments.

¹⁶ All participants in either experiment were informed of the importance of answering the questionnaire as precisely and honestly as possible and that responses would remain confidential. Subjects invited to the Payment experiment were told that those who completed the questionnaire would be entered into a prize draw, conducted publicly with two prizes of £50. Participants were given the date, time, and venue of the draw and invited to attend; they were also told that the winners would be contacted by email if they did not attend, so that payment was not conditional on attendance.




Fig. 1. The moral evaluation function in the Simultaneous treatments.

task-responses. This is a useful preliminary for what follows, as well as of some independent interest.

We sent the same number of invitations to participate in each experiment; and, in response, 306 subjects completed the Payment experiment, compared with 232 in the No-Payment experiment. This suggests that paying a random participation fee can be an effective (and cheap) way to increase the response rate. A Probit regression analysis reported in the Appendix (Table A1) supports this conclusion.

More importantly, the coefficient on the Payment variable in the regression analysis of moral evaluations reported in the Appendix (Table A2) is not statistically significant. Thus, it does not seem that the difference between the two experiments had any important impact on responses. In our view this indicates that there is no selection bias between those who participate in the two experiments.¹⁷ We therefore proceed below by pooling the data.

5.1. How is free riding judged? The simultaneous case

We begin our main analysis with the Simultaneous treatments, in which, in each scenario, Person A and Person B decide without knowing the action of the other. Here, and below, the main tool for our analysis is the mean “moral evaluation function” (MEF). This is an aggregate measure of the moral ratings that subjects assigned to the free rider (Person B), expressed as a function of the effective contribution levels of his non-judged counterpart (Person A). Fig. 1 shows the mean MEF, for each of the two Simultaneous treatments.

The horizontal axis indicates Person A's effective contribution, measured in number of tokens. The vertical axis indicates the average moral rating that subjects assigned to Person B, who is always a complete free rider. On this axis, the point 0 denotes that free riding is perceived to be of no moral significance. Ratings below 0 imply that subjects perceive free riding as morally blameworthy; whereas ratings above 0 imply that subjects perceive free riding as morally

praiseworthy. The 95% confidence intervals for the mean moral evaluation in each of the five scenarios of each treatment are also shown.

Three features of Fig. 1 are particularly striking. First, the average moral rating of Person B's free riding is negative in all cases shown, suggesting that subjects do regard the decision problem in the scenarios as having a moral dimension and free riding as a blameworthy act. Second, the MEF for the Give treatment is always below that for the Take treatment indicating that, on average, subjects condemn total failure to contribute to the group project more strongly than complete withdrawal of support from it. Third, for each frame, the MEF is negatively sloped: the free rider is condemned more strongly the greater the other player's net contribution, even though moves are simultaneous.

To understand the observed pattern of judgments better, we divided subjects into three categories (response patterns): (1) subjects with a flat MEF, (2) subjects with a negatively sloped MEF, and (3) “Others”, including non-monotonic subjects and subjects with a positively sloped MEF.¹⁸ The mean MEFs for the Give and Take treatments, for each of these three response patterns, are shown in the three panels of Fig. 2, respectively. The percentage of subjects in the relevant treatment falling in a given category is shown, as are the 95% confidence intervals for the mean moral evaluation in each of the five scenarios.

The largest category, accounting for 46.7% and 52.9% of subjects in Give and Take treatments respectively, consists of those whose MEF is flat across the five effective contribution levels of Person A. The overwhelming majority of subjects with a flat MEF assigned a negative rating to the free rider, and the average is indeed highly significantly negative in both treatments. (Only 12.8% of subjects thought free riding is of no moral significance and therefore assigned a zero rating across all scenarios.) The second largest category is those subjects for whom free riding is more reprehensible the greater Person A's effective contribution (38.5% and 30.4% of subjects in Give and Take treatments, respectively). The third category (“Others”)

¹⁷ This result is consistent with Cleave et al. (2010) and Falk et al. (2010) who also did not find a selection bias with regard to subjects' social preferences.

¹⁸ Non-monotonic subjects refer to those whose MEF is strictly negatively sloped in one range and strictly positively sloped in another.




Fig. 2. The moral evaluation function for each rating pattern in the Simultaneous treatments.

comprises a minority (14.8% and 16.7% of subjects in Give and Take treatments, respectively) who have neither flat nor monotonically decreasing ratings.

We also investigate moral evaluations in the simultaneous treatments econometrically. Table 2 documents OLS models (with

robust errors clustered on subjects), with the moral evaluation of Person B as the dependent variable. We report two sets of models. The first set of models (1) to (4) consists of a variable “Tokens”, which takes the values of Person A’s effective contribution (0, 5, 10, 15, and 20); the dummy variable “Take”, which equals 1 for the Take

Table 2
Moral evaluation of the free rider in simultaneous treatments – Regression results.

	(1) All subjects	(2) Subjects with negatively sloped function	(3) Subjects with flat function	(4) "Others"	(1') All subjects	(2') Subjects with negatively sloped function	(4') "Others"
Tokens	−0.689*** (0.085)	−1.620*** (0.116)		−0.438** (0.213)			
Take	6.989*** (2.179)	5.796 (3.497)	7.066** (3.187)	13.102*** (4.798)	5.834** (2.437)	4.367 (4.055)	10.883* (6.162)
Tokens × Take	0.090 (0.120)	−0.014 (0.194)		−0.168 (0.303)			
Male	−2.342 (2.224)	−3.025 (3.621)	−2.183 (3.245)	−4.961 (5.087)	−2.342 (2.229)	−3.025 (3.644)	−4.961 (5.161)
5 tokens					−9.481*** (1.374)	−19.327*** (2.483)	−13.75*** (4.273)
10 tokens					−11.422*** (1.533)	−24.788*** (2.478)	−12.65** (4.852)
15 tokens					−12.837*** (1.601)	−29.423*** (2.445)	−10.15** (3.914)
20 tokens					−15.541*** (1.863)	−35.442*** (2.611)	−12.75** (4.855)
5 tokens × Take					3.126 (1.923)	3.089 (3.856)	5.272 (6.538)
10 tokens × Take					2.400 (2.200)	1.527 (4.124)	0.998 (7.171)
15 tokens × Take					1.902 (2.319)	1.256 (4.151)	−4.024 (6.356)
20 tokens × Take					2.874 (2.606)	0.561 (4.357)	0.446 (6.510)
Constant	−10.975*** (1.456)	−5.669*** (1.926)	−15.721*** (2.361)	−8.249** (3.599)	−8.006*** (1.557)	−0.069 (2.121)	−2.769 (3.478)
Obs.	1365	470	680	215	1365	470	215

Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered on individuals. Models (1) to (4): The variable "Tokens" takes the value "x" when Player A effectively contributes x tokens, where "x" takes on the values 0, 5, 10, 15, and 20. The variable "Tokens" and its interaction with "Take" were excluded for the subjects whose MEF was flat. Models (1'), (2') and (4'): Separate dummies for different levels of Person A's effective contribution; these dummies also interacted with "Take". Model (3') would be identical to model (3) and is therefore omitted.

* $p < 0.1$.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

treatment, and 0 for the Give treatment; the dummy variable "Male", which equals 1 if subjects were male and 0 otherwise; and finally an interaction variable "Tokens × Take".

In model (1), which uses all subjects, we find that moral evaluations drop significantly in Person A's effective contribution. Moral judgments are significantly higher in the Take treatment. The interaction variable "Tokens × Take" and the dummy variable Male are insignificant. Models (2) to (4) separate subjects according to the shape of their MEF. Subjects with a negatively sloped MEF (model (2)) do not report significantly different moral evaluations in the Take treatment than in the Give treatment. By contrast, subjects with a flat MEF (model (3)) and "Others" (model (4)) think free riding in Take is significantly less immoral than free riding in Give. The interaction variable "Tokens × Take" and the dummy "Male" are both insignificant in models (2) to (4).¹⁹

The second set of models discards the assumption of linearity in Tokens made in the previous set and splits the variable "Tokens" up into separate dummy variables for the different effective contribution levels of Person A (taking effective contribution of 0 by Person A as the omitted benchmark). This is redundant when the only subjects considered have flat MEFs. But, for each of models (1), (2) and (4), there is a corresponding model (1'), (2') and (4') respectively, that uses the separate dummy variables just described in place of "Tokens". All conclusions from the first set of models hold in these less restrictive ones as well. In particular, the mean MEF (model (1')) is negatively sloped, ceteris paribus, since the coefficients of the four scenario dummy variables are all negative, statistically different from zero, and

also jointly different from each other (from F-test, p -value = 0.000), corroborating the increasing condemnation hypothesis.²⁰

It turns out that subjects with a flat MEF and subjects classified as "Others" are (at least weakly) significantly more condemning in the Give than in the Take treatment, whereas for subjects with negatively sloped MEFs frame insensitivity holds in that we find no statistically significant difference across frames. Thus, the existence of a framing effect in our aggregate data for the Simultaneous treatments can be attributed largely to those subjects who condemn free riding equally across scenarios, or to "Others".

5.2. Do sequential moves make a difference?

We now turn to the Sequential treatments, where Person B observes Person A's choice before making his own decision. An immediately striking feature is the relative sizes of categories of subject: in stark contrast to Simultaneous treatments, very few subjects in Sequential treatments (3.9% and 5.1% in Give-Sequential and Take-Sequential, respectively) have flat MEFs; instead, people with negatively sloped MEFs comprise by far the largest category (88.3% and 77.4% in Give-Sequential and Take-Sequential, respectively). Given this preponderance of one category, we do not disaggregate by category in the remainder of the section. Fig. 3 illustrates our findings graphically, showing the mean MEF across all subjects facing Sequential treatments. As before, 95% confidence intervals of mean evaluations are shown for each scenario.

Comparison of Fig. 3 with Fig. 1 reveals some notable similarities and differences. Once again, for all scenarios where Player A's effective

¹⁹ We also ran a set of regressions including an interaction variable "Tokens × Male". This interaction variable is not significant.

²⁰ We also ran pair wise Wald tests: 5 versus 10 tokens ($p = 0.0051$); 10 versus 15 tokens ($p = 0.0574$); and 15 versus 20 tokens ($p = 0.0014$).




Fig. 3. The moral evaluation function in the Sequential treatments.

contribution is non-zero, the mean moral evaluation of the free rider, Player B, is negative – indicating condemnation. Also, the mean MEF for the Give frame again lies below that for the Take frame whenever Person A's effective contribution is non-zero, indicating that the

framing effect observed in Simultaneous treatments is largely robust to a sequential order of moves.

The main qualitative differences between Figs. 3 and 1 relate to the slope of the MEF, which appears steeper in the Sequential case. Especially when Player A's effective contribution is 10 or more, the average condemnation of Player B is notably stronger in Sequential treatments than in the corresponding Simultaneous treatments. Also, interestingly, there is a directional difference in the judgment of Person B's free riding, when Person A free rides too. In contrast to the Simultaneous treatments, people in the Sequential treatments regarded it as morally *praiseworthy* for Player B to “rat on a rat”.

Table 3 presents econometric analysis of the Sequential treatments. The specifications are analogous to those of Table 2 (except that we do not disaggregate by category of subject). Both Person A's effective contribution and the Give versus Take framing have significant effects on the moral evaluation of Person B. In model (1) of Table 3, this is reflected in significantly positive coefficients on “Tokens”, “Take” and the interaction variable “Tokens×Take”; in model (1'), it is shown by the significance of the interaction terms between the framing and scenario dummies.²¹

Table 3
Moral evaluation of the free rider in sequential treatments – Regression results.

	(1) All subjects	(1') All subjects
Tokens	-2.088*** (0.092)	
Take	4.191** (2.025)	1.054 (2.515)
Tokens×Take	0.341** (0.152)	
Male	-0.731 (1.962)	-0.731 (1.967)
5 tokens		-27.398*** (2.102)
10 tokens		-35.25*** (2.155)
15 tokens		-40.586*** (2.148)
20 tokens		-45.602*** (2.159)
5 tokens×Take		7.596*** (2.848)
10 tokens×Take		8.754*** (3.072)
15 tokens×Take		8.148** (3.253)
20 tokens×Take		8.258** (3.387)
Constant	-1.580 (1.584)	7.309*** (1.968)
Obs.	1325	1325

Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered on individuals. Model (1): The variable “Tokens” takes the value “x” when Player A effectively contributes x tokens, where x takes on the values 0, 5, 10, 15, 20. Models (1'): Separate dummies for different levels of Person a's effective contribution; these dummies also interacted with “Take”.

** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.

6. Conclusion and discussion of results

This paper contributes to economics and moral psychology by investigating experimentally the moral judgments people pass on an important form of economic behaviour: free riding in public goods games. We see this as a small contribution towards a wider empirical research agenda on agents' ethical views that can be seen as one response to Amartya Sen's concern with the relationship between ethics and economics, especially as it relates to agents' motivations. The idea that ethical commitments may affect behaviour without being reducible to preferences is a long-standing argument of Sen's (see, for example, Sen, 1973, 1977).

²¹ In respect of Person A's contributions, all pair wise comparisons (5 versus 10 tokens; 10 versus 15 tokens; and 15 versus 20 tokens) are highly significantly different from each other (Wald tests, all with p<0.0001).

Rather than free rider problems from the natural economy, we have used scenarios involving a two-player public goods game like those typically used in experimental investigations. Such investigations have played a major role in generating stylized facts about the determinants of contributions to public goods²² and in inspiring theory development.²³ Yet, whether people perceive a moral dimension to the interaction between them in public goods experiments and, if so, how their moral judgments vary with features of the interaction, has hitherto been unexplored. This is the gap we address.

Our study leaves interesting avenues for further research, including the relationship between moral judgments and (contribution and sanctioning) behaviour in experimental public goods games; and the robustness of our findings on judgment across alternative designs and across a wider range of social dilemmas, including more naturalistic ones, and/or across subject-pools more representative of the general population.²⁴ But, nevertheless, it provides a useful step in the empirical analysis of moral judgment of free riding. Our main findings can be summarized as follows:

- Finding 1 On average, free riding is judged morally reprehensible in all cases considered, except that it is judged morally commendable to “rat on a rat” (i.e. to free ride knowing that the co-player has already free ridden).
- Finding 2 *Ceteris paribus*, failure to contribute to the public good is condemned more strongly, on average, than total withdrawal of support from the public good. This holds both in the Simultaneous and the Sequential treatments.
- Finding 3 On average, moral judgments conform to the increasing condemnation hypothesis (that a free rider is condemned more strongly the larger is the effective contribution of his co-player). In Simultaneous treatments, about half of the subjects pass judgments on the free rider that is independent of the effective contribution of the other player. Yet, the overwhelming majority of subjects in Sequential treatments conform to the increasing condemnation hypothesis, as do a substantial minority in Simultaneous treatments.

Finding 1 is the most fundamental, in that it suggests that public goods problems are perceived as having a moral dimension. Subjects do not, in general, give neutral moral judgments of a free rider in our scenarios. Given this, the question becomes what drives the judgments they do give. Findings 2 and 3 are part of the answer to this question. Together, they show that moral judgments of the free rider are sensitive to the framing of the scenario and, in some cases, to the behaviour of the other player in it.

We end by interpreting these findings from the perspectives of the reason-based and emotion-based models of moral judgment discussed in Section 3.

Interpreted from the perspective of the reason-based model, our findings are indicators of the prior moral principles that subjects apply. For this view to account for Finding 2 would require that subjects endorse moral principles that distinguish between non-contribution and withdrawal, even when their monetary consequences are the same. Such principles would have to be non-consequentialist.

The reason-based model fits well with people who judge Person B equally across scenarios in the Simultaneous treatments, since doing so is consistent with the responsibility doctrine or with deontological moral principles. However, the reason-based model can explain the commendation of ratting on a rat and, more generally, the greater

prevalence of increasing condemnation in Sequential treatments than Simultaneous treatments, indicated by Finding 3, only if a substantial number of subjects endorse principles that call for some form of reciprocation. Even if they do, it would be difficult to account for the presence of a substantial minority who display increasing condemnation in Simultaneous treatments on the reason-based account unless some subjects are prepared, as a matter of principle, and in line with the moral luck doctrine, to condemn the free rider on the basis of actions taken by his co-player for which he is not directly responsible and of which he was unaware at the moment of choice.

The emotion-based model of judgment suggests a different explanation of our findings. According to this model, judgments are *ex post* rationalizations of emotional or affective reactions to the scenarios. Even for impartial observers, free riding might cue emotions such as anger, disgust, irritation, or milder forms of distaste. On this view, increasing condemnation could arise from stronger affective reactions to scenarios that seem particularly unequal or unfair on the non-judged player. A further possibility, particularly applicable to the Sequential treatment, is that Person A is seen as trusting Person B to reciprocate when he makes a non-zero effective contribution, and that subjects experience a negative emotional response to the betrayal of this trust.

If, in some judges, such reactions of distaste are cued more by relative effective contribution than by consideration of the facts known to the free rider, that would explain the presence of increasing condemnation in Simultaneous treatments (as well as in Sequential ones). Thus accounted for, the finding is in line with the outcome bias in ethical judgments identified by Gino et al. (2009). Indeed, from this perspective, the surprising feature of our findings is not so much the presence of subjects who conform to the increasing condemnation hypothesis in Simultaneous treatments as the fact that the modal group does not do so.

Emotional responses could also explain the positive evaluation of “ratting on a rat”, for example if there is a positive affective response to the first free rider getting what he deserved when the judged player free rides back.

A priori, and given the findings of research in moral psychology (Haidt, 2001) the emotion-based model seems a promising way to explain framing effects in judgments, as it is quite possible that details of the description of different scenarios might cue different emotional responses. However, to explain the direction of the framing effect that we have observed requires more than just this remark and is not straightforward. Our prior expectation was that, if framing made a difference, Player B's free riding would be condemned more strongly when the Take frame is used because, in this case, a zero effective contribution involves abrogating for himself some part of the group project; whereas, in the Give frame, players are merely allocating their own endowment. This conjecture can also be supported by the theory of loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), if the initial status quo is taken as the reference-point. On this view, Player A suffers a loss as a result of Player B's action in the Take frame, but not in the Give frame. If subjects condemn the imposition of losses more strongly than the corresponding failure to grant a gain, Player B would be condemned more strongly in the Take frame, contrary to our Finding 2.

One possible explanation of Finding 2 is that subjects take Person B to have been given a gift (i.e. the endowment) in the Give frame and condemn him for not sharing it; whereas they see the players as having to fend for themselves in the Take frame and are disinclined to judge them harshly for doing so. A related possibility is that subjects see responsibility for the group project as more ambiguous in the Take frame than the Give frame, so cuing stronger moral responses in the latter case.

To conclude, as this discussion shows, it is not straightforward to interpret all of our empirical findings; nor was our design intended to discriminate conclusively between the reason-based and emotion-

²² For overviews, see Ledyard (1995), Zelmer (2003), and Gächter and Herrmann (2009).

²³ See, for example, Gintis (2003), Fehr and Schmidt (2006), Fehr and Gintis (2007), and Gintis et al. (2008).

²⁴ For recent steps in a naturalistic direction using a similar impartial spectator method (albeit in different public policy contexts and using a different form of moral judgment), see Konow (2009).

based models. But, one conclusion does seem clear: our findings cannot be explained by subjects forming their moral judgments by applying simple consequentialist moral principles. Instead, the picture of moral judgments which emerges from our study is one in which they respond to features of the whole situation, not just to the consequences of the judged action, narrowly conceived.²⁵ We suggest that, while it is not impossible to reconcile this feature of our findings with the reason-based model, the totality of the findings fits somewhat more easily with the emotions-based model.

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Appendix A. Supplementary regressions on the role of participation fees

Table A1. Does paying a random participation fee affect response rates?

Independent variables	Dependent variable: participation = 1; no-participation = 0
Payment	0.054*** (0.015)
Male	-0.013 (0.015)
Obs.	2718

Notes: probit estimation. Marginal effects listed. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. The variable "Payment" is a dummy variable equal to 1 for those subjects who participated in the "Payment" condition and 0 otherwise. The variable "Male" is a dummy variable equal to 1 for male subjects and 0 otherwise.

*** denotes significance at the 1-percent level.

Table A2. Does paying a random participation fee affect moral evaluations?

Independent variables	Dependent variable: moral evaluations of the free rider
Person A contributes 5 tokens	-15.571*** (0.923)
Person A contributes 10 tokens	-20.314*** (1.046)
Person A contributes 15 tokens	-23.942*** (1.133)
Person A contributes 20 tokens	-27.507*** (1.224)
Payment	1.529 (1.534)
Male	-0.857 (1.531)
Constant	0.108 (1.526)
Obs.	2690

Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered on individuals.

*** denotes significance at the 1-percent level.

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²⁵ This leaves open that subjects may conceive consequences more broadly or combine consequential and deontological reasoning in ways such as those discussed by Sen (1982b) and ch. 3 of Sen (1987).

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